openSUSE Tumbleweed — targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide

📖 ~4 min read  •  Source: SUSE security advisory (see also SUSE bugzilla)

Related CVEs: CVE-2020-10699 CVE-2020-13867

Upstream summary: A flaw was found in Linux, in targetcli-fb versions 2.1.50 and 2.1.51 where the socket used by targetclid was world-writable. If a system enables the targetclid socket, a local attacker can use this flaw to modify the iSCSI configuration and escalate their privileges to root.

Table of contents

1. Symptom & Impact
2. Environment & Reproduction
3. Root Cause Analysis
4. Quick Triage
5. Step-by-Step Diagnosis
6. Solution – Primary Fix
7. Solution – Alternative Approaches
8. Verification & Acceptance Criteria
9. Rollback Plan
10. Prevention & Hardening
11. Related Errors & Cross-Refs
12. References & Further Reading

Symptom & Impact

On openSUSE Tumbleweed hosts that have targetcli-fb-common installed, administrators report behaviour consistent with SUSE security advisory: zypper dup --dry-run shows pending rolling updates, services backed by targetcli-fb-common fail or restart unexpectedly, AppArmor profile warnings appear in journalctl -k — and for security-rated advisories the host is exposed to the vulnerability set above. Impact ranges from a single service-restart loop to wider availability incidents whenever targetcli-fb-common sits on the serving path.

Environment & Reproduction

Reproduction targets openSUSE Tumbleweed. Confirm release and installed package:

cat /etc/os-release
rpm -q targetcli-fb-common
zypper info targetcli-fb-common | head -20
zypper lr -E                              # enabled repositories

Trigger the workflow that exposes targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide while collecting:

sudo journalctl -u targetcli-fb-common -b --no-pager | tail -200
sudo journalctl -xe --no-pager | tail -200
sudo tail -200 /var/log/zypp/history
sudo journalctl -k | grep -i apparmor | tail -100
# Bundle evidence for SUSE / community support:
sudo supportconfig -R /var/tmp -B targetcli-fb-common

Root Cause Analysis

Root cause is documented in SUSE security advisory. openSUSE security maintainers shipped fixes in the corresponding targetcli-fb-common update for openSUSE Tumbleweed; running an outdated build leaves the host exposed to the failure modes described in the advisory. Correlate zypper history with system logs:

sudo zypper history | grep targetcli-fb-common
sudo zypper history --since='-7 days' | tail -40
sudo journalctl -k | grep -i apparmor | tail -100
cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted   # non-zero = tainted kernel / out-of-tree modules
snapper list | tail -20         # snapshots taken around each zypper transaction

Quick Triage

Run these on openSUSE Tumbleweed to capture the current state of targetcli-fb-common:

rpm -q targetcli-fb-common                              # installed NVR
rpm -V targetcli-fb-common                              # verify shipped files
sudo zypper ref                            # refresh repos
sudo zypper dup --dry-run                  # pending rolling updates
systemctl --failed --no-pager
sudo firewall-cmd --list-all
sudo aa-status                             # AppArmor profiles
# If targetcli-fb-common ships a systemd unit (unit name may differ from pkg name, e.g.
# bind→named, postgresql-server→postgresql, php-fpm→php-fpm):
systemctl list-unit-files | grep -i targetcli | head

Step-by-Step Diagnosis

1. List failed systemd units.

   systemctl --failed --no-pager

2. Tail the journal for targetcli-fb-common and the system bus.

   sudo journalctl -u targetcli-fb-common -f --no-pager
   sudo journalctl -xe -f --no-pager

3. Inspect firewall posture (firewalld is the default on openSUSE).

   sudo firewall-cmd --list-all-zones --permanent
   sudo nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | head -50

4. Surface AppArmor denials and switch the profile to complain mode if needed.

   sudo journalctl -k | grep -i 'apparmor="DENIED"' | tail -30
   sudo aa-status
   sudo aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.targetcli-fb-common 2>/dev/null || true

5. Verify targetcli-fb-common integrity and reinstall if anything is altered.

   sudo rpm -V targetcli-fb-common
   sudo zypper verify
   sudo zypper install --force targetcli-fb-common

6. Inspect Snapper snapshots to know exactly which transaction introduced the regression.

   sudo snapper list | tail -20
   sudo snapper status <pre-id>..<post-id>

7. Correlate findings with /var/log/zypp/history, zypper history, and SUSE security advisory to pin the change that introduced targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide.

Solution – Primary Fix

Apply the corrective zypper transaction referenced by SUSE security advisory, then reload affected systemd units:

sudo zypper ref                                      # refresh repos
# Tumbleweed is a rolling release — use 'dup', not 'patch':
sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change             # rolling distribution upgrade
# To target only the affected package while still on rolling:
sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change targetcli-fb-common
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
# Unit name may differ from pkg name; check first:
systemctl list-unit-files | grep -i targetcli | head
sudo systemctl restart targetcli-fb-common
rpm -q targetcli-fb-common                                          # confirm new NVR
systemctl is-active targetcli-fb-common 2>/dev/null                 # confirm running (if a unit exists)

For kernel / glibc / systemd / openssl rolls a reboot is required. Tumbleweed does not ship Live Patching, so plan a maintenance window or use Snapper to roll back if a regression appears:

sudo zypper ps -s                      # services using deleted libs
sudo snapper list | tail -5            # confirm pre/post snapshots exist
sudo systemctl reboot                  # or: sudo shutdown -r now

Solution – Alternative Approaches

If the primary fix is not viable, choose from these:

• Roll back via Snapper (Btrfs snapshots are taken automatically before zypper transactions on openSUSE Tumbleweed). This is the primary safety net for openSUSE administrators:

  sudo snapper list
  sudo snapper status <pre-id>..<post-id>   # diff between two snapshot numbers
  sudo snapper undochange <pre-id>..<post-id>
  sudo snapper rollback <pre-id>            # boot the host into the chosen snapshot
  sudo systemctl reboot

• Lock the package so zypper cannot upgrade it:

  sudo zypper al targetcli-fb-common                   # add lock
  zypper ll | grep targetcli-fb-common                 # list locks
  sudo zypper rl targetcli-fb-common                   # remove lock

• Install an older NVR if a regression is suspected:

  zypper se -s targetcli-fb-common                     # show all available versions
  sudo zypper install --oldpackage targetcli-fb-common-<older-NVR>

• Disable the AppArmor profile briefly to confirm policy is the cause, then re-enable:

  sudo aa-disable /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.targetcli-fb-common
  # reproduce, capture denials in the journal:
  sudo journalctl -k | grep apparmor | tail
  sudo aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.targetcli-fb-common

• Pin Tumbleweed to a known-good snapshot from the openSUSE history server while you investigate. This keeps the rolling release reproducible across a fleet:

  # Edit /etc/zypp/repos.d/repo-oss.repo and point baseurl at
  #   http://download.opensuse.org/history/<YYYYMMDD>/tumbleweed/repo/oss/
  sudo zypper ref
  sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change

Verification & Acceptance Criteria

All of these should pass after the fix:

rpm -q targetcli-fb-common                                            # expected fixed NVR
sudo zypper dup --dry-run                                # no pending rolls expected
systemctl is-active targetcli-fb-common 2>/dev/null
sudo journalctl -u targetcli-fb-common --since "5 minutes ago" --no-pager | grep -iE "error|fail" || echo OK
sudo firewall-cmd --list-services
sudo aa-status | head -5
sudo zypper ps -s                                        # any services still using deleted libs

The original reproduction for targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide must not trigger across two consecutive runs.

Rollback Plan

Capture state before any change. On openSUSE, Snapper is the canonical rollback path:

rpm -qa > /root/rpm-pre.txt
sudo zypper history list > /root/zypper-history-pre.txt
# Snapper takes pre/post snapshots automatically on Btrfs root.
sudo snapper create -d 'pre-patch-targetcli-fb-common'   # explicit named snapshot
sudo snapper list | head

To revert if the patch / roll is bad:

# Preferred on Btrfs root — boot the prior snapshot:
sudo snapper list
sudo snapper rollback <pre-id>
sudo systemctl reboot
# Or downgrade just the package:
sudo zypper install --oldpackage targetcli-fb-common-<older-NVR>
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl restart targetcli-fb-common
# Custom AppArmor profile cleanup:
sudo apparmor_parser -R /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.targetcli-fb-common

Prevention & Hardening

Reduce the chance of this recurring on openSUSE Tumbleweed:

• Run rolling upgrades on a schedule — Tumbleweed receives a snapshot most weekdays. Stagger across the fleet so any regression is caught early:

  sudo zypper ref
  sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change
  # Optional: drive from salt/ansible with a maintenance window per host group.

• Subscribe to opensuse-security-announce and watch suse.com/support/update.

• Lock sensitive packages so they cannot be auto-upgraded:

  sudo zypper al targetcli-fb-common

• Ensure Snapper is enabled on the root subvolume and pre/post hooks run for every zypper transaction. This is the cornerstone of safe openSUSE patching:

  sudo snapper -c root get-config | head
  # Default zypper plugin: /usr/lib/zypp/plugins/commit/snapper.zypp-commit-plugin
  sudo snapper list | tail -10

• Monitor file integrity with AIDE:

  sudo zypper install -y aide
  sudo aide --init && sudo mv /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new /var/lib/aide/aide.db
  sudo aide --check

• Keep AppArmor profiles in enforce; review /etc/apparmor.d/ after every package upgrade.

• Apply CIS / openSUSE hardening guidance and use salt or ansible to enforce baseline state across the fleet.

Related Errors & Cross-Refs

Issues that commonly surface alongside targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide: zypper lock contention, systemd unit ordering cycles, AppArmor denials, firewalld zone drift, and kernel taint flags. Useful triage:

sudo zypper ps -s
systemd-analyze critical-chain
sudo journalctl -k | grep apparmor | tail
sudo firewall-cmd --get-active-zones
cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
sudo snapper list | tail

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References & Further Reading

Primary reference: SUSE security advisory (see also SUSE bugzilla). Manual pages useful on openSUSE Tumbleweed:

man zypper
man zypper.conf
man systemctl
man journalctl
man firewall-cmd
man snapper
man apparmor
man aa-status

Other resources: openSUSE documentation, suse.com/security, openSUSE security portal, and per-package notes in /usr/share/doc/packages/targetcli-fb-common/ for components implicated in targetcli-fb-common — multiple vulnerabilities (2 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide.

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