Affected versions: FreeBSD 15

📖 ~4 min read  •  Source: FreeBSD VuXML

VuXML topic: password-store — GPG parsing vulnerabilities

Related CVEs: CVE-2018-12356

Upstream summary: Jason A. Donenfeld reports: Markus Brinkmann discovered that [the] parsing of gpg command line output with regexes isn't anchored to the beginning of the line, which means an attacker can generate a malicious key that simply has the verification string as part of its username. This has a number of nasty consequences: an attacker who manages to write into your ~/.password-store and also inject a malicious key into your keyring can replace your .gpg-id key and have your passwor

Table of contents
  1. Symptom & Impact
  2. Environment & Reproduction
  3. Root Cause Analysis
  4. Quick Triage
  5. Step-by-Step Diagnosis
  6. Solution – Primary Fix
  7. Solution – Alternative Approaches
  8. Verification & Acceptance Criteria
  9. Rollback Plan
  10. Prevention & Hardening
  11. Related Errors & Cross-Refs
  12. References & Further Reading

Symptom & Impact

Nothing visibly changes on a FreeBSD 15 host until password-store is next invoked: it runs, exits and leaves no daemon behind, so there is no restart loop or service log to watch. Exposure is per-invocation, and the invocations that matter are the unattended ones — cron jobs, backup and deployment scripts, CI runners, and anything passing attacker-influenced input such as a remote URL, a supplied archive or an untrusted filename. Where password-store is run under sudo or from a privileged job, the same flaw becomes local privilege escalation. password-store ships command-line programs that run when invoked and then exit, so there is no service to restart — service(8) and /var/log/messages have nothing to act on; only the next invocation matters.

Environment & Reproduction

Reproduction targets FreeBSD 15. Confirm with freebsd-version -kru, uname -a, and the installed package via pkg info password-store and pkg query "%n-%v" password-store. Capture system state with pkg audit -F and service -e. Trigger the workflow that exposes password-store while collecting tail -200 /var/log/messages, dmesg -a, and /var/log/pkg.log.

Root Cause Analysis

Root cause is tracked at FreeBSD VuXML. The FreeBSD ports security team shipped a corrective password-store port revision; hosts on an outdated build remain exposed. Correlate /var/log/pkg.log with /var/log/messages and kernel state in sysctl kern.lastpid + sysctl kern.osreldate to isolate the change that triggered the failure mode.

Quick Triage

Quick triage: tail -100 /var/log/messages, pkg audit -F, pkg version -v password-store, and pfctl -sr (or ipfw list) to confirm firewall posture. For kernel issues: dmesg -a | tail -100 and kldstat.

Step-by-Step Diagnosis

1) service -e to enumerate failed services. 2) tail -F /var/log/messages and dmesg. 3) Validate firewall via pfctl -sr -v or ipfw show. 4) pkg check -B password-store for integrity. 5) pkg install -fy password-store to reinstall if tampered. 6) Correlate findings with /var/log/pkg.log and FreeBSD VuXML to pin the commit that introduced the regression.

Solution – Primary Fix

Primary fix: install the corrective password-store port revision referenced by FreeBSD VuXML. Typical commands: sudo pkg update, sudo pkg upgrade password-store (or sudo pkg upgrade -y for the whole system), then and pkg audit to confirm no remaining advisories. For ports tree builders: sudo portsnap fetch update + cd /usr/ports/<cat>/password-store && sudo make deinstall reinstall clean. Reboot if the kernel module is involved.

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Solution – Alternative Approaches

Alternatives include locking the package with sudo pkg lock password-store until vetted, downgrading via pkg install <older-version> from a pinned repo, switching the FreeBSD pkg repository between quarterly and latest in /usr/local/etc/pkg/repos/FreeBSD.conf, isolating the affected service in a jail (iocage/bastille) with stricter firewall rules, or replacing the service with a vendored static build for the period between exposure detection and full rollout.

Verification & Acceptance Criteria

Acceptance: pkg info password-store shows the expected fixed version is running, pkg audit returns no advisory for password-store, tail -50 /var/log/messages shows no errors after restart, and the original reproduction for password-store no longer triggers across two consecutive runs.

Rollback Plan

Capture state with pkg query "%n-%v" > /root/pkg-pre.txt and a ZFS boot-environment snapshot: bectl create pre-password-store-patch. To revert, run sudo pkg install -f <previous-version> or boot the previous BE via bectl activate pre-password-store-patch && reboot. For kernel/loader changes, drop to the loader prompt and select the previous boot environment.

Prevention & Hardening

Prevent recurrence by scheduling pkg audit -F via periodic.conf (daily_status_security_pkgaudit_enable="YES"), subscribing to freebsd-security-notifications, mirroring through a local pkg repo managed by poudriere, version-pinning sensitive packages with pkg lock, enabling automatic ZFS BE snapshots before upgrades, and monitoring file integrity via mtree or aide. Apply the CIS FreeBSD hardening checklist where applicable and harden jails with allow.* tunables in /etc/jail.conf.

Related issues that commonly surface alongside password-store: pkg lock contention, mismatched ABI after kernel/userland skew (freebsd-version vs uname -K), pf rule drift, and stale shared-library references after upgrade (pkg check -d).

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References & Further Reading

Primary reference: FreeBSD VuXML. Supporting docs: FreeBSD Handbook, man pkg, man freebsd-update, man pfctl, man ipfw, man bectl, man periodic.conf, the FreeBSD Security Advisories at security.freebsd.org, and /usr/ports/UPDATING for port-specific notes implicated in this advisory.