openSUSE Tumbleweed — mruby — multiple vulnerabilities (13 CVEs) — patch and remediation guide

📖 ~4 min read  •  Source: SUSE security advisory (see also SUSE bugzilla)

Related CVEs: CVE-2022-1212 CVE-2022-0080 CVE-2022-1276 CVE-2022-1427 CVE-2022-1286 CVE-2022-0481 CVE-2022-0623 CVE-2022-0717  +5 more

Upstream summary: Use-After-Free in str_escape in mruby/mruby in GitHub repository mruby/mruby prior to 3.2. Possible arbitrary code execution if being exploited.

Table of contents

1. Symptom & Impact
2. Environment & Reproduction
3. Root Cause Analysis
4. Quick Triage
5. Step-by-Step Diagnosis
6. Solution – Primary Fix
7. Solution – Alternative Approaches
8. Verification & Acceptance Criteria
9. Rollback Plan
10. Prevention & Hardening
11. Related Errors & Cross-Refs
12. References & Further Reading

Symptom & Impact

mruby is executed by every process started from it, so a flaw here surfaces inside your applications rather than in mruby itself: header-parsing and request-smuggling bugs in the bundled HTTP stack, weaknesses in the runtime’s own TLS and crypto code, unsafe archive, XML or deserialisation handling in the standard library, or memory-safety bugs in the JIT. Long-lived workers such as application servers, JVM daemons and resident node processes keep executing the old build after openSUSE Tumbleweed replaces it on disk, so a patched machine stays exposed until each one is restarted. mruby is an interpreter or virtual machine plus its standard library, not a daemon: it runs only inside processes you start, so there is no mruby unit to restart — restart the applications that execute it instead.

Environment & Reproduction

Reproduction targets openSUSE Tumbleweed. Confirm release and installed package:

cat /etc/os-release
rpm -q mruby
zypper info mruby | head -20
zypper lr -E                              # enabled repositories

Exercise the workload that uses mruby while collecting:

sudo zypper ps  # NATIVE SUSE TOOL, no extra package: every running process still using deleted/replaced files, plus the owning service name
sudo zypper ps -s  # short table (PID, PPID, UID, login, command, service) without the per-file detail
sudo zypper ps -sss  # service names ONLY, one per line - safe to pipe straight into systemctl
sudo journalctl -xe --no-pager | tail -200
sudo tail -200 /var/log/zypp/history
sudo journalctl -k | grep -i apparmor | tail -100
# Bundle evidence for SUSE / community support:
sudo supportconfig -R /var/tmp -B mruby

Root Cause Analysis

Root cause is documented in SUSE security advisory. openSUSE security maintainers shipped fixes in the corresponding mruby update for openSUSE Tumbleweed; running an outdated build leaves the host exposed to the failure modes described in the advisory. Correlate zypper history with system logs:

sudo zypper history | grep mruby
sudo zypper history --since='-7 days' | tail -40
sudo journalctl -k | grep -i apparmor | tail -100
cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted   # non-zero = tainted kernel / out-of-tree modules
snapper list | tail -20         # snapshots taken around each zypper transaction

Quick Triage

Run these on openSUSE Tumbleweed to capture the current state of mruby:

rpm -q mruby                              # installed NVR
rpm -V mruby                              # verify shipped files
sudo zypper ref                            # refresh repos
sudo zypper dup --dry-run                  # pending rolling updates
systemctl --failed --no-pager
sudo firewall-cmd --list-all
sudo aa-status                             # AppArmor profiles
rpm -ql mruby | grep -E '^/(usr/lib|etc)/systemd/(system|user)/[^/]+\.(service|socket|timer|path|target|mount)$'  # the units mruby REALLY ships - NO OUTPUT means it ships no service at all, so never run systemctl on it
rpm -ql mruby | grep -E '^/usr/sbin/rc[^/]+$'  # SUSE-only rcNAME compat symlink (it points at /usr/sbin/service, not at a unit): the NAME after 'rc' IS the service name - bind ships /usr/sbin/rcnamed, so the unit is named.service

Step-by-Step Diagnosis

1. List failed systemd units.

   systemctl --failed --no-pager

2. Tail the journal for mruby and the system bus.

   sudo journalctl -xe -f --no-pager

3. Inspect firewall posture (firewalld is the default on openSUSE).

   sudo firewall-cmd --list-all-zones --permanent
   sudo nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | head -50

4. Surface AppArmor denials and switch the profile to complain mode if needed.

   sudo journalctl -k | grep -i 'apparmor="DENIED"' | tail -30
   sudo aa-status

5. Verify mruby integrity and reinstall if anything is altered.

   sudo rpm -V mruby
   sudo zypper verify
   sudo zypper install --force mruby

6. Inspect Snapper snapshots to know exactly which transaction introduced the regression.

   sudo snapper list | tail -20
   sudo snapper status <pre-id>..<post-id>

7. Correlate findings with /var/log/zypp/history, zypper history, and SUSE security advisory to pin the change that introduced the regression.

Solution – Primary Fix

Apply the corrective zypper transaction referenced by SUSE security advisory, then reload affected systemd units:

sudo zypper ref                                      # refresh repos
# Tumbleweed is a rolling release — use 'dup', not 'patch':
sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change             # rolling distribution upgrade
# To target only the affected package while still on rolling:
sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change mruby
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
# Unit name may differ from pkg name; check first:
sudo systemctl daemon-reload  # load unit files replaced by the update; this alone restarts nothing
sudo systemctl restart UNIT1.service UNIT2.service  # restart several in ONE transaction - systemd applies their own After=/Before= ordering, so low-level units (dbus, database, broker) go before their consumers
sudo systemctl restart UNIT.service  # NOTE: 'systemctl reload' is NOT enough after a library patch - the process must re-exec to map the new .so
sudo systemctl reload apparmor.service  # only if 'rpm -ql mruby | grep /etc/apparmor.d/' showed the package ships AppArmor profiles
rpm -q mruby                                          # confirm new NVR

For kernel / glibc / systemd / openssl rolls a reboot is required. Tumbleweed does not ship Live Patching, so plan a maintenance window or use Snapper to roll back if a regression appears:

sudo zypper ps -s                      # services using deleted libs
sudo snapper list | tail -5            # confirm pre/post snapshots exist
sudo systemctl reboot                  # or: sudo shutdown -r now

Solution – Alternative Approaches

If the primary fix is not viable, choose from these:

• Roll back via Snapper (Btrfs snapshots are taken automatically before zypper transactions on openSUSE Tumbleweed). This is the primary safety net for openSUSE administrators:

  sudo snapper list
  sudo snapper status <pre-id>..<post-id>   # diff between two snapshot numbers
  sudo snapper undochange <pre-id>..<post-id>
  sudo snapper rollback <pre-id>            # boot the host into the chosen snapshot
  sudo systemctl reboot

• Lock the package so zypper cannot upgrade it:

  sudo zypper al mruby                   # add lock
  zypper ll | grep mruby                 # list locks
  sudo zypper rl mruby                   # remove lock

• Install an older NVR if a regression is suspected:

  zypper se -s mruby                     # show all available versions
  sudo zypper install --oldpackage mruby-<older-NVR>

• Disable the AppArmor profile briefly to confirm policy is the cause, then re-enable:

  # reproduce, capture denials in the journal:
  sudo journalctl -k | grep apparmor | tail

• Pin Tumbleweed to a known-good snapshot from the openSUSE history server while you investigate. This keeps the rolling release reproducible across a fleet:

  # Edit /etc/zypp/repos.d/repo-oss.repo and point baseurl at
  #   http://download.opensuse.org/history/<YYYYMMDD>/tumbleweed/repo/oss/
  sudo zypper ref
  sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change

Verification & Acceptance Criteria

All of these should pass after the fix:

rpm -q mruby                                            # expected fixed NVR
sudo zypper dup --dry-run                                # no pending rolls expected
sudo firewall-cmd --list-services
sudo aa-status | head -5
sudo zypper ps -s                                        # any services still using deleted libs

The conditions described in the advisory must no longer be reported for mruby across two consecutive runs.

Rollback Plan

Capture state before any change. On openSUSE, Snapper is the canonical rollback path:

rpm -qa > /root/rpm-pre.txt
sudo zypper history list > /root/zypper-history-pre.txt
# Snapper takes pre/post snapshots automatically on Btrfs root.
sudo snapper create -d 'pre-patch-mruby'   # explicit named snapshot
sudo snapper list | head

To revert if the patch / roll is bad:

# Preferred on Btrfs root — boot the prior snapshot:
sudo snapper list
sudo snapper rollback <pre-id>
sudo systemctl reboot
# Or downgrade just the package:
sudo zypper install --oldpackage mruby-<older-NVR>
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
# Custom AppArmor profile cleanup:

Prevention & Hardening

Reduce the chance of this recurring on openSUSE Tumbleweed:

• Run rolling upgrades on a schedule — Tumbleweed receives a snapshot most weekdays. Stagger across the fleet so any regression is caught early:

  sudo zypper ref
  sudo zypper dup --no-allow-vendor-change
  # Optional: drive from salt/ansible with a maintenance window per host group.

• Subscribe to opensuse-security-announce and watch suse.com/support/update.

• Lock sensitive packages so they cannot be auto-upgraded:

  sudo zypper al mruby

• Ensure Snapper is enabled on the root subvolume and pre/post hooks run for every zypper transaction. This is the cornerstone of safe openSUSE patching:

  sudo snapper -c root get-config | head
  # Default zypper plugin: /usr/lib/zypp/plugins/commit/snapper.zypp-commit-plugin
  sudo snapper list | tail -10

• Monitor file integrity with AIDE:

  sudo zypper install -y aide
  sudo aide --init && sudo mv /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new /var/lib/aide/aide.db
  sudo aide --check

• Keep AppArmor profiles in enforce; review /etc/apparmor.d/ after every package upgrade.

• Apply CIS / openSUSE hardening guidance and use salt or ansible to enforce baseline state across the fleet.

Related Errors & Cross-Refs

Issues that commonly surface alongside a mruby update: zypper lock contention, systemd unit ordering cycles, AppArmor denials, firewalld zone drift, and kernel taint flags. Useful triage:

sudo zypper ps -s
systemd-analyze critical-chain
sudo journalctl -k | grep apparmor | tail
sudo firewall-cmd --get-active-zones
cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
sudo snapper list | tail

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References & Further Reading

Primary reference: SUSE security advisory (see also SUSE bugzilla). Manual pages useful on openSUSE Tumbleweed:

man zypper
man zypper.conf
man systemctl
man journalctl
man firewall-cmd
man snapper
man apparmor
man aa-status

Other resources: openSUSE documentation, suse.com/security, openSUSE security portal, and per-package notes in /usr/share/doc/packages/mruby/ for components implicated in this advisory.

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